This paper studies volume-return dynamics in a framework with endogenous information production that is linked to a rm's investment activities. My framework generates time-varying dierences of opinion and trading volume, especially when a rm receives (unexpected) positive or negative news. In addition, my framework predicts cross-sectional variation regarding the ability of volume shocks to predict future returns (often referred to as the high volume return premium). Using standard CRSP monthly data, I document that the high volume return premium is economically and statistically stronger (increases from 6% to 12% per annum) for rms that exhibit poor stock market or operating performance prior to volume shocks; for rms that receive positive news when volume shocks hit; and for rms that have high degrees of information asymmetry. I also examine volume shocks around earnings announcements, and nd additional supporting evidence for my framework. *
Introduction
This paper studies information stock market volume shocks contain about an underlying rm. To accomplish this, I explore an economic framework that explains the positive return predictability of volume shocks; this predictability is known as the high volume return premium. A key feature of the framework is that it allows for the information ow of a rm to be endogenous and time-varying. Consistent with the model prediction, a strong cross-sectional variation in the ability of volume shocks to predict future returns is empirically documented. In particular, high volume return premia are found to be stronger (by around 6% per annum) for rms that have (1) low past stock returns; (2) poor past operating performance; (3) high contemporaneous stock returns when volume shocks hit; (4) received positive earnings surprises when volume shocks hit; (5) been covered by a small number of analysts; and (6) poor earnings quality.
The investigation begins with the proposal of a parsimonious model of endogenous information ow and heterogeneous investors. The model builds upon the endogenous information model in Veldkamp (2005) . In this framework, rms undertake more economic activities and generate more information in good times than bad times.
More specically, the Veldkamp (2005) model is extended by adding two types of investors who can trade the rm's shares. One type of investor observes only public information and is called an unsophisticated investor. The other type of investor possesses private information and is called a sophisticated investor. The two types of investors are Bayesian updaters who hold dynamic beliefs regarding the probability that the rm is in its good state.
1 One can think of good states as being associated with innovative times; times when the rm receives positive technology shocks or eciency gains. In contrast, bad states are associated with normal times; times when the rm receives negative technology shocks or eciency losses.
Consider a rm that has 20 independent investment opportunities ( projects ) in each period. In good times, the rm invests in 15 projects; in bad times, it only invests in ve projects. The model assumes sophisticated investors can observe the outcomes of all 20 projects, but unsophisticated investors can only observe the outcomes of those projects that are undertaken (i.e., 15 in good times and ve in bad times). One can think of a sophisticated investor as being able to (by himself/herself or by hiring an analyst) conduct research to determine the potential outcomes of all the investment opportunities. When the rm transits from its bad state to its good state, unsophisticated investors can only infer the state is switching from the outcomes of the ve projects, while sophisticated investors can learn about the transition from 20 outcomes. During these transitions, a large information gap exists between the two types of investors. On the other hand, when a rm makes the transition from its good state to its bad state, unsophisticated investors can infer whether the rm is in a new state from the outcomes of 15 projects. The information gap between unsophisticated investors and sophisticated investors in this scenario is small. To summarize, the class of models in this investigation generates a large information gap and large dierences in beliefs between the two types of investors when a rm transitions from its bad state to its good state. The information gap tends to be small when a rm does not switch states and when a rm transitions from its good to its bad state. This feature is not generated in economic frameworks where information 1 The states I model are rm-specic. They should not be interpreted as economy-wide states, such as a boom/recession, or ups/downs in the stock markets.
ow is exogenous and constant across time.
My model generates a number of testable predictions regarding the dynamics of trading volume and returns. For example, turnover (trading volume normalized by shares outstanding) is predicted to be larger when a rm receives positive news vs. negative news. Empirically the three-day abnormal turnovers around earnings announcements are examined. It is found that turnover shocks associated with positive earnings surprises are larger, than those associated with negative earnings surprises.
In addition, dierences come primarily from rms with poor earnings quality, suggesting the dierences are due to information trading. Gervais, Minglegrin, and Kaniel (2001) are the rst to document the ability of daily/weekly extreme volume to positively predict future 20-day returns. They name the return dierence the high volume return premium. Kaniel, Ozoguz, and Starks (2012) conrm that the high volume return premium exists in their sample of 41 countries. Both existing high volume return premium papers view return predictability as coming directly from the limited attention of investors. Large positive turnover shocks attract investors' attention. Stock prices tend to appreciate in the short term after large turnover shocks. This price appreciation comes from more optimistic views being incorporated into prices, due to short sale constraints that aect most assets (see Miller (1977) for a well-known reference about short sale constraints). Alternatively, there may be better risk sharing after a large turnover shock due to the growth of the investor base (Merton, 1987) .
My model predicts high volume return premia exist but the underlying rationale is dierent from a pure attention story. The high volume return premium arises in my model because a large turnover shock contains information about the transition of a rm's specic state. A large turnover shock is more likely to be associated with a rm's transition from its bad state to its good state than vice versa and this information diuses gradually. The distinct underlying reasons for the return predictability leads to new predictions regarding the cross-section, as well as the longer run performance in the time-series dimension.
My model predicts a stronger high volume return premium among rms for which the turnover shocks are more likely to be information induced, rather than from other motives. The attention story of Gervais, Minglegrin, and Kaniel (2001) does not yield such a prediction. I conduct simulations based on my model and empirically verify that high volume return premia are stronger among rms believed to be in their bad states before the volume shock hits, that receive high contemporaneous price shocks at the time of the volume shock, and that have a higher degree of information asymmetry.
I also examine the long-run stock market and operating performance after a rm receives volume shocks. In my model, the high volume premium should have a permanent price eect because information is revealed to the unsophisticated investors with a delay. By contrast, the attention story suggests either price appreciation should revert in the long run or the high volume premium eect becomes weaker in the more recent period, because attention levels cannot increase innitely. I track stocks for 24 months after they receive high and low volume shocks. The premium after large volume shocks is mostly in the rst quarter and does not revert after 24 months. At the same time, I show that the high volume premium has not become weaker (actually, it has become even stronger for small stocks) in the recent decade. The evidence poses a challenge to be explained by the attention story alone.
My paper complements the literature studying volume-return relationships. Karpo (1987) surveys the contemporaneous relationships between volume and returns and between volume and the absolute value of returns. Karpo concludes that both have positive relationships. Campbell et al. (1993) postulates that, if the primary motive for trading is informationless hedging, extreme short-term stock returns associated with large trading volumes will tend to be later reversed. Conrad et al. (1994) verify the reversion empirically for NASDAQ stocks. Wang (1994) , on the other hand, argues that when the primary motive for trading is to take advantage of private information, stock returns associated with large trading volumes will tend to continue. Cooper (1999) veries the argument of Wang (1994) for large NYSE and AMEX stocks. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) complement the results of Cooper (1999) by illustrating that the momentum strategies Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) document are more protable when focusing on high volume stocks. Llorente et al. (2002) empirically verify the predictions of Wang (1994) , that the relationship between volume and return auto-correlation is related to the extent of informed trading using daily frequency data. Lerman, Livnat, and Mendenhall (2008) nd that the positive relationship between earnings announcement-period trading volume and subsequent returns is complementary to the positive relationship between earnings surprises and subsequent returns. Grin, Nardari, and Stultz (2007) investigate the dynamic relationships between market-wide trading activity and returns across 46 markets. The authors nd that many stock markets exhibit strong positive relationships between turnover and past returns.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the model and empirical predictions. Section 3 describes the data I use in the empirical tests. Section 4 reports the empirical ndings. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
In my model, the economy is dened on an innite time sequence t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . In the economy, there is one rm with a risk neutral manager who maximizes share-holder value by choosing among available investment projects. There are two types of investors labeled sophisticated and unsophisticated . The investor types dier in their information structures and endowments. The rm experiences both good and bad states. The rm manager and investors hold dynamic beliefs about the probability that the rm is in its good state. All agents know the structure of the economy.
The Firm
Each period, the rm has N available projects. Project n costs c n and generates a one-time payo in the same period of either v or 0. The projects can be ordered such that c 1 < c 2 < ... < c n < ... < c N . I assume the rm faces the same set of projects each period.
The probability of success for a given project is independent across projects, but depends on a hidden state variable ω t ∈ {ω g , ω b }. Here g as indicates good times and b indicates bad times. Each project succeeds with the probability θ g when the rm is in its good state and θ b when the rm is in its bad state. The underlying state follows a Markov process with symmetric transition probabilities ψ < 0.5. In this model, I assume the probability of success in good states equals the probability of failure in bad states (i.e., θ g = 1 − θ b ). The success or failure of project n is denoted by a dummy variable I n t (1 for success and 0 for failures).
The Firm's Manager
The rm manager's sole task is to undertake positive net present value (NPV) projects.
The rm manager is assumed to be risk neutral and drawn from the pool of sophisticated investors. I denote the manager's belief of the probability that the rm is in its good state as µ i t and the number of projects he/she takes to be n t at time t. Project j is undertaken only if its NPV is positive (i.e., v(µ
The number of projects undertaken by the rm is denoted by n t and can be written as follows. Note that n t is a non-decreasing function of the manager's beliefs.
Two Types of Investors
The two types of investors (sophisticated and unsophisticated) can trade a riskless bond and risky shares of the rm. The riskless bond is assumed to have an innitely elastic supply at a constant positive interest rate r f . I denote 1 + r f as R. 
The sophisticated investors solve the following problem:
Similarly, the unsophisticated investors solve the following problem:
The market clears by:
Beliefs
Because I assume that past private information is leaked to the unsophisticated investors at the start of each period, both investor types always have same prior beliefs.
I denote both investor types' common prior beliefs at time t as µ prior t .
The rm manager (hired from sophisticated investors) decides to invest in n(µ prior t ) out of N projects. The sophisticated investors and unsophisticated investors update their beliefs after observing the outcomes of the projects.
I write the number of successful projects among n t taken projects to be s t and the successful projects among the untaken N − n t projects to be k t − s t .
Using Bayes' law, the posterior belief for the sophisticated investors is:
The posterior belief for the unsophisticated investors is:
The sophisticated and unsophisticated investors' common prior belief about the rm's state in the next period is:
Equilibrium
In the model, the rate of public information ow is determined by the number of projects the rm undertakes. When the rm manger thinks the rm is in the bad state (i.e., he/she has a low prior belief ), the rm undertakes a small number of projects.
This low level of investment reduces the amount of public information and widens the information gap between the two investor types. This information gap results in a large dierence in posterior beliefs between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors when the rm switches from its bad state to its good state. On the contrary, when the rm makes the transition from its good state to its bad state, the high level of investment activities undertaken by the rm produces abundant public information to the unsophisticated investors about state switching. Dierences in posterior beliefs between two investor types in these scenarios are small.
In Figure I , I plot the model-generated dierence in the posterior beliefs between the sophisticated and unsophisticated investors as a function of prior beliefs (µ prior ) conditional on the current state realization. When the current state realization is good When investors have a high prior belief and the rm's true state is good, the dierence in beliefs is small, because the amount of new information is small. Likewise, the dierence in beliefs is small when investors have low prior beliefs and the rm's true states are bad. Interestingly, the dierence in beliefs is very large when investors originally believe the rm is in the bad state (prior belief is low), but the true state is actually good. This large dierence in beliefs is a result of the large information gap when the rm undertakes a low level of investment activities and produces spare public information. In contrast, the dierence in beliefs is not large when investors start with high prior beliefs but the true state turns out to be bad. This is because the rm, in these cases, tends to undertake a large number of projects which generate abundant public information. I establish this asymmetry more formally in Proposition I.
Proposition I: The dierence in the posterior beliefs between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors when the rm switches to the good state is larger than (or equal to) the dierence of when the rm switches to the bad state.
The equality only holds when n(µ prior t
) is a constant. Proof in Appendix A.
To solve for the equilibrium price and turnover, one has to write out the distribution function of the future beliefs. However, the changing number of signals complicates the distribution of future beliefs and makes the innite period model analytically intractable. I establish the existence of the equilibrium by applying the contract mapping theorem.
Proposition II: The economy, as dened in section 1.1 to 1.4, has a unique steady-state equilibrium in which P, x i , x u is the solution of simultaneous equations, as follow:
Simulated Results
In this section, I analyze the properties of the equilibrium with a numerical simulation.
For details on the simulation procedures, please refer to Appendix B.
In Figure Similar patterns are found in the empirical data and will be discussed in the empirical section in Table IV . Table II tabulates the model's empirical predictions regarding the cross-sectional variation of turnover shocks' return predictability. In the model, turnover shocks predict future returns, because turnover shocks contain information about the rm's transition of states. Large turnover shocks are more likely to be associated with a rm's transition from its bad state to its good state, rather than from its good state to its bad state.
In each of the three panels in Table II , I simulate the rms by giving investors random prior beliefs, the realization of the states of two succeeding periods and the endowment shocks of the non-traded asset. I solve for equilibrium prices and turnovers and then repeat the exercise 10,000 times.
I illustrate that the predictability of turnover shocks on future returns are higher for rms when investors have low prior beliefs (before turnover shocks hit), that receive large positive current price shocks (at the time turnover shocks hit). The return predictability is stronger for these rms, because the predictability is driven by these rms that transit from their bad states to good states. I also show that the predictability of turnover shocks on future returns are higher for rms that have high degrees of information asymmetry. For these stocks, turnover shocks more likely come from information-induced trading, than hedging-induced trading. Thus large turnover shocks are more informative about the rm's state-switching for rms with higher degrees of information asymmetry.
In Table II In Table II Panel B, I show that the ability of turnover shocks to predict future returns is stronger for stocks that receive large positive current price shocks than for stocks that receive large negative current price shocks. Moving from left to right across the panel (i.e., from stocks that receive negative to positive current price shocks), the average return dierences between stocks receiving high turnover shocks and low turnover shocks are 0.01, 0.00, 0.05, 0.05, 0.17 respectively. 
Empirical Predictions of the Model
The model generates a number of predictions that I categorize into two groups, new empirical predictions and empirical regularities.
New Empirical Predictions 1. Turnover is larger when a rm receives positive news vs. negative news.
2. Return predictability due to a turnover shock is stronger for stocks that investors hold low prior beliefs (that the rms' states are good.)
3. Return predictability due to a turnover shock is stronger among stocks that receive positive news (at the time of the shock.)
4. Return predictability due to a turnover shock is stronger for stocks with higher degrees of information asymmetry.
5. A larger proportion of the high volume return premium comes from the rms that receive positive volume shocks rather than those receiving negative volume shocks.
6. The high volume return premium results in a permanent price eect. 2 In the second sample, I
study turnover shocks and price reactions around quarterly earnings announcements.
My sample includes all announcements from 1995 to 2010 covered by I/B/E/S.
2 For a detailed discussion, see Hong and Stein (2000) .
Monthly Sample
Monthly turnover shocks are a key variable in this paper and dened following the three steps below:
Step 1, For stock i in month t, turnover is dened as trading volume (V ol i,t )
divided by shares outstanding (Shrout i,t ).
Step 2, I normalize the turnover by rst subtracting the average turnover from month t-48 to month t-13 and then dividing by the average turnover over the same period. I require at least 12 months of non-missing turnover data when calculating the 36-month averages. Normalized turnover measures the degree to which the current month's turnover is above or below normal/recent turnover levels. In addition, normalized turnovers are used to compare companies which may trade heavily or thinly.
3
T urn * i,t = T urn i,t −Avg(T urn i,t−13 ,T urn i,t−14 ,...,T urn i,t−48 ) Avg(T urn i,t−13 ,T urn i,t−14 ,...,T urn i,t−48 )
Step 3. I dene the turnover shock to be the change in the normalized turnover
The empirical results that will subsequently be presented are not aected when I normalize turnover using the data from months t-48 to t-7 or months t-36 to t-13, nor are the results aected when I only examine the NYSE and AMEX stocks. 3 I do not scale turnover by its standard deviation because turnover is heteroskedastic. 4 Gervais, Kaniel and Mingelgrin (2001) excludes NASDAQ stocks in their sample because Gould and Kleidon (1984) reports that trading volume for NASDAQ stocks is inated relative to NYSE and AMEX stocks due to the double counting of dealer trades. I do not exclude NASDAQ rms in my primary sample because I use turnover shock (change in normalized turnover), rather than raw turnover. Recent papers such as Kaniel, Starks and Ozoguz (2012) , also include NASDAQ stocks in their sample.
Quarterly Earnings Announcements Sample
I dene normalized turnover associated with earnings announcements in a manner similar to Eq (5). The key dierence is that I focus on the daily data. I use 3-day average turnovers around an earnings announcement as raw turnover and dene the period between day -81 and day -22 from the earnings announcement day as the normal/recent period. Please see Appendix D for details.
For each earnings announcement, I calculate the associated earnings surprise (ES i,q ) by rst calculating the dierence between announced earnings per share (e i,q ) and consensus earnings forecast (F i,q ). Then we normalize this dierence by the stock price (P i,q ) at the end of the corresponding quarter.
5 Some of my empirical tests use a positive (negative) earnings surprise as a proxy for positive (negative) news.
The announced earnings number (e i,q ) is from Compustat. The analysts earnings forecast consensus (F i,q ) is dened as the median of the most recent forecasts from the individual analysts using the I/B/E/S detail tape.
6
I calculate earnings quality (EQ i,q ) based on the cross-sectional regression of total current accruals in year m on cash ow from operations in year m-1, m, m+1, P P E, and change in revenues in year m. I dene earnings quality as 0.1 minus the standard deviation of the a rm's residuals from the previous regression over years m-4 to m.
7
The higher this measure, the better the rm's earnings quality. Some of my empirical 5 My denition follows Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009). 6 In estimating the analyst consensus, I only include one-quarter ahead forecasts issued or reviewed from 60 calendar days before the end of the scal quarter to the earnings announcement date. If an analyst made multiple forecasts during that period, I take his/her most recent forecast. Earnings and stock prices are both split-adjusted. I record earnings surprise as missing when the stock price is less than $1 before split-adjustment, or when earnings or forecasts are greater than the stock price.
7 My denition follows Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper (2005) , with a slight dierence; their original denition is simply the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression. I present time-series averages of cross-sectional means for market capitalization, analyst coverage, turnover shocks, and returns. Firms in the lowest and highest turnover shock quintiles tend to have smaller market capitalizations. These rms are also covered by fewer numbers of analysts, than rms in the middle three quintiles. Stocks receiving larger turnover shocks have higher contemporaneous returns. This is consistent with my model, that a larger turnover shock is more likely to be associated with a rm's transition from its bad state to its good state.
Stocks receiving larger turnover shocks also earn higher future returns. This is an example of the high volume return premium documented by Gervais, Kaniel and Mingelgrin (2001) . Stocks in the highest turnover shock quintile earn 1.72% in the 8 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
subsequent month, while stocks in the lowest turnover shock quintile only earn 1.16%.
9 Table III In Panel C, I sort rms into quintiles by normalized turnover (T urn * i,q,−1,+1 ) in each scal quarter, then report the time-series average of cross-sectional means for earnings surprises, earnings quality, normalized turnover, CAR −1,+1 , and CAR +2,+61 . Earnings quality is, on average, lower in the highest and lowest turnover quintiles. Normalized 9 In Appendix C2, I also illustrate that this return dierence has a Fama-French-Carhart 4 factors adjusted alpha of 0.60%, which translates into 7.20% per annum. Both the raw return dierence and adjusted alpha are statistically signicant at 1% level. I also show in Appendix C2 that the return predictability of turnover shocks are robust to dierent sample periods and weighting schemes. The predictability becomes stronger for small stocks, but weaker for large stocks in the later sample period.
turnover positively predicts CAR +2,+61 , which veries ndings in Lerman, Livnat and Mendenhall (2008) . The CAR +2,+61 for stocks in the highest turnover quintile are 1.94%, while it is -0.67% for stocks in the lowest turnover quintile. This means the high volume return premium in the 60 days after earnings announcements is 2.61%. Consistent with my model, a larger proportion of the high volume return premium is from the positive shocks (1.99%), rather than the negative shocks (-0.67%). Table IV presents the results related to a test of one of the model's key assumptions.
Empirical Results

Dierences of Opinions and Earnings Surprises
In my model, when investors have low (high) prior beliefs that a rm is in its good
state, the rm undertakes few (many) projects. The realizations of outcomes of the undertaken projects produce sparse (abundant) public information, which leads to a large (small) information gap, and large (small) dierences of posterior beliefs between the two types of investors. Empirically, I take an event study approach to test whether the dierences of opinions become higher (lower) after investors' prior beliefs decrease (increase). I use analyst forecast dispersion as a proxy for the dierences of beliefs.
I use negative (positive) earnings surprises as an event after which investors' beliefs decreases (increases) .
For each scal quarter, I sort stocks by earnings surprise (ES i,q ) into quintile portfolios. I then calculate the time series average of cross-sectional mean analyst forecast dispersion (Disp i,t ) in each of the ve months around the rm's earnings announcement month. I focus on the change of mean dispersion from month t-2 and 10 Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) dene analyst forecast dispersion as the standard deviation of analyst forecasts scaled by the mean forecasts. 
Turnover Around Earnings Announcements
In this section, I test model Prediction #1, that the turnover is larger when a rm receives positive vs. negative news. Results are presented in Table V. To proxy for positive vs. negative news, I sort rms into quintile portfolios by earnings surprise (ES i,q ) for each scal quarter. In Panel A of Table V, I illustrate the average 3-day normalized turnover (T urn * −1,+1 ) across the ve quintiles. I nd the normalized turnover to be 0.7959 for the lowest earnings surprise group and 0.8534 for the highest earnings surprise group. The dierence is statistically signicant at the 1% level.
I further examine whether this dierence is driven by information-induced trading or trading on other motives. I use earnings quality (EQ i,q ) as a proxy for the degree of information asymmetry. Firms with more discretionary accruals (Low EQ) are assumed to be more opaque and have a higher degree of information asymmetry.
I conduct an independent double sort of rms around earnings announcements by earnings quality and earnings surprise. I report the average turnover shocks and the dierence of turnover shocks between highest earnings surprise quintile and lowest earnings surprise quintile in columns 1-5 of Table V . Across the ve groups sorted by earnings quality, four have positive dierences except for quintile 4th, which has an insignicant negative dierence.
The dierence becomes larger when I move from high earnings quality rms to low earnings quality rms. In the lowest earnings quality quintile, the turnover shocks are 0.7575 for the lowest earnings surprise groups and 1.0761 for the highest earnings surprise group. The dierence is as large as 42% (0.3186) and statistically signicant at the 1% level. The higher dierences for poorer earnings quality rms is not likely due to a larger dispersion in earnings surprises as I illustrate that the correlation between earnings surprise and earnings quality is 0 and the correlation between the absolute value of earnings surprise and earnings quality is only 0.18 in Appendix C1
. Furthermore, it can be observed that turnover shocks tend to be smaller for rms with better earnings quality. This result suggests that the pattern I observe in total turnover shocks is likely to be from information-induced trading. In summary, the evidence supports Prediction #1.
Return Predictability of Turnover Shocks
In this section, I test model Predictions #2, #3 and #4 regarding the cross-sectional variations of return predictability of turnover shocks. I have already illustrated in To test Prediction #2, I use the past 12-month returns (Ret i,t−11,t ) as a proxy for investors' prior beliefs about the state of the rm. Past poor stock market performance is likely to reect pessimistic views of investors, while past strong performance is likely to be associated with high beliefs that a rm is in its good state.
I conduct a dependent 5 × 5 double-sorting rst by the past 12-month stock return and then by turnover shock. Each bin's equally-weighted one-month return over month t+1 (Ret i,t+1 ) is reported in Table VI . I focus on the return dierence between high turnover shocks stocks and low turnover shocks stocks (high volume return premium). One can observe a monotonically decreasing high volume return premium across stocks that have low to high past 12-month returns. For stocks in the lowest quintile (past loser stocks), the high volume return premium is 1.27% with a FamaFrench-Carhart 4 factor alpha 1.28%. For stocks in the highest quintile (past winner stocks), the high volume return premium is not economically and statistically dierent from zero. In Appendix C4, I provide robustness checks by using the past 6-month returns in the rst sort. I also skip a month when calculating past returns and nd the conclusions hold. I then use some other proxies for investors' prior beliefs, including rms' ROA, ROE, change in ROA and change in ROE. I nd that for rms with poorer operating performance, the high volume return premium is stronger. Results are presented in Appendix C4.
I present the results associated with a test of model Prediction #3 in Table VII. I use the high contemporaneous return (Ret i,t ) to proxy for positive news and the low contemporaneous return for negative news.
11 Similar to Table III , Panel C that a larger proportion of the high volume return premium is from stocks that receive the positive volume shocks (1.99%), rather than the negative volume shocks (-0.67%). Below I examine the stock price reaction around and after earning announcements in a closer manner.
In every scal quarter from 1995 to 2010, I sort all earnings announcements rst by earnings surprise (ES) and then by a 3-day normalized turnover (T urn * −1,+1 ). The average event window 3-day cumulative abnormal return (C AR −1,+1 ) and post-earningsannouncement 60-day cumulative abnormal return (C AR +2,+61 ) are presented respectively in Table IX , Panel A and B.
In Table IX shocks proxies the degree of attention. New information are incorporated into prices at a faster speed when the attention level is higher.
In Table IX On the contrary, CAR +2,61 is only -0.07% for stocks in the lowest earnings surprise, highest turnover portfolio. This contrasts sharply with the drift for stocks in the highest earnings surprise, highest turnover portfolio given stocks in these two portfolios have a similar size of 3-day event-window price reaction. This is consistent with my model, because turnover shocks, when a rm receives negative news, are more likely to be from hedging-induced trading, than when a rm receives positive news. In addition, the associated post-earning announcement drift tends to be less signicant.
One can observe that stocks in the lowest earnings surprise, highest turnover portfolio have higher CAR +2,+61 , than those in the lowest earnings surprise, lowest turnover portfolio. The dierence is primarily driven by the negative drift of those rms that have low turnover shocks. This could be consistent with the visibility hypothesis of Merton (1987) , that for the lowest earnings surprise, the highest turnover stocks, the potential price appreciation from an increase in visibility and the potential negative drift due to gradual diusion of information, cancel each other out and results in an insignicant drift.
To summarize, my results suggest that both the endogenous information ow hypothesis I provide and visibility hypothesis of Merton (1987) seem to play roles in explaining the high volume return premium.
In addition, in Appendix C2, I show in my monthly sample that a larger proportion of high volume return premium is coming from the rms that receive positive volume shocks, rather than those that receive negative volume shocks. Across six combinations of sub-samples and weighting schemes, the long side of the strategy makes up more than 70% (50%) of the total high volume return premium in four (ve) combinations.
Long-run Performance of High Volume Return Premium
In this section, I consider the long-run performance of stocks after receiving high Although I do not intend to run a horse race between my mechanism and the limited attention hypothesis, the evidence that rms with high contemporaneous returns and positive earnings surprises have stronger high volume return premium poses a challenge that is dicult to be explained by the limited attention hypothesis alone.
In an examination of price reactions around earnings announcements, the evidence suggests that both my mechanism and the limited attention-based explanations play roles in explaining the high volume return premium. The high volume return premia for stocks with low earnings surprises are likely to be generated by the increase of visibility, while the premia for stocks with high earnings surprises are likely to be due to the endogenous information ow hypothesis.
One direction for future research is to decompose volume shocks into informationinduced and hedging-induced. The decomposition could help dierentiate between the endogenous information ow hypothesis and limited attention hypothesis in explaining the high volume return premium. More generally, endogenous information ows oers a rich and varied set of predictions regarding volume-return dynamics.
Extending my framework, possibly to include production and/or real options, could link trading behaviors closer to rm fundamentals. 
Current State Realization
